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INTRODUCTION

In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or
Superfund).' The aim of CERCLA was to provide the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with the authority
to compel the clean up of hazardous waste sites2 and otherwise to
protect public health and the environment from releases of hazardous substances and waste. 3 In 1986, Congress enacted the
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 §§ 101-308, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982) [hereinafter CERCLA].
2. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 9604; see also United States v. Conservation Chem. Co.,
628 F. Supp. 391, 404 (W.D. Mo. 1985) ("[t]he fundamental purpose of CERCLA is to provide for the expeditious and efficacious cleanup of hazardous waste
sites"); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-1143
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (the objective of CERCLA is to "facilitate the prompt cleanup of
hazardous dump sites by providing a means of financing both governmental and
private responses and by placing the ultimate financial burden upon those responsible for the danger").
3. CERCLA was to deal principally with health and environmental
problems associated with the improper disposal of hazardous waste that primarily result in the contamination of groundwater. See 126 CONG. REC. 26,338
(1980). CERCLA (and later, SARA) represents the legislative response to the
tremendous danger to human life and the ecosystem presented by the introduc-
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4
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA).
SARA extended the original CERCLA statute for five additional
years. 5 Additionally, SARA was aimed at accelerating response
activity and providing substantial additional funding for the
6
cleanup of hazardous waste sites.
Important aspects of the SARA amendments were those
aimed at clarifying some questions that had arisen regarding the
"third party" defense that was contained in CERCLA section
107(b) 7 as initially enacted.8 In attempting to clear up the ambiguities in the statute, Congress defined certain troublesome
terms 9 and, as disclosed by the legislative history, established various hierarchies that the courts and the EPA were to look to for
guidance when such a defense was raised.' 0 In so doing, Congress established what has come to be known as the "innocent
landowner" defense." While it is a type of a "third party" de-

tion of toxic materials into groundwater and soil. H.R. REP. No. 253(I), 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 54, rrinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835,

2836.
4. Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1614 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 96019675 and other provisions of the U.S.C. (Supp. V 1987)).
5. CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611.
6. See Bayko & Shore, Stormy Weather on Superfund Front Forecast as 'Hurricane
SARA'Hits, Nat'l LJ., Feb. 16, 1987, at 24, col. 1.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
8. The original version of CERCLA section 107(b) contained an exclusive
list of affirmative (third party) defenses. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
9. Prior to SARA, the most troublesome definition the courts faced concerned whether the term "contractual relationship" as used in CERCLA section
107(b)(3) was meant to include deeds, leases, and other instruments of transfer
of ownership. The term "contractual relationship" was defined in SARA by adding a new subsection to the definition section, CERCLA section 101(35).
Before SARA, the EPA took the position that a real estate deed represented a
contractual relationship within the meaning of CERCLA section 107(b)(3),
thereby eliminating the availability of this defense for a landowner in the chain
of title with the party responsible for the release of the hazardous substance.
Before SARA's enactment, however, this issue was never addressed by a court.
But see United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546
(W.D.N.Y. 1988) (upholding government's argument on this issue in applying
pre-SARA law).
10. Congress established the pertinent hierarchy regarding the level of "all
appropriate inquiry" that will be required of landowners, as used in CERCLA
section 101 (35)(B). Congress dictated that commercial transactions will be held
to the highest level of inquiry, private residential transactions will be held to a
more lenient level of inquiry, and bequests and inheritances will to be held to
the most lenient level of inquiry. See JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE
COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
187-88 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 3279-

80. Both the courts and the EPA have acknowledged this hierarchy in their
treatment of the innocent landowner defense.
11. The "innocent landowner defense," while not titled as such, is a term of
art that has been coined by commentators and practitioners. The innocent land-
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fense,' 2 as a statutory defense to CERCLA liability, it has its own
separate set of requirements and qualifications in addition to
some of the straightforward third party defense requirements.' 3
Although Congress went to great lengths in establishing the innocent landowner defense, there have arisen problems of interpretation in the courts that have left landowners somewhat unsure
about the nature of the defense.' 4 The EPA, for its part, re5
mained silent on its position regarding such ambiguities.'
Finally, on June 6, 1989, following years of development, the
EPA publicly announced its interpretation of the innocent landowner defense to Superfund liability.' 6 The EPA, in its interpretation, adopts a pragmatic approach to the difficult issues of law
and policy inherent in this area.' 7 The EPA's position, however,
is problematic because it leaves unanswered the key determination, the determination that is providing the courts with the most
difficult problems in this area.' 8 Instead of defining the "all appropriate inquiry" standard, they finesse the question by stating
that it will remain a determination to be made on a case by case
basis. As a result, at least one amendment has been proposed by
Congress to aid in clearing up the inherent ambiguities in making
this key determination.' 9
This Comment will attempt to analyze the utility of the SARA
amendments and the changes that they have made with respect to
third party defenses enumerated by the CERCLA. It will also be a
vehicle for analyzing recent court decisions that have wrestled
owner defense is actually a type of third party defense under CERCLA section
107(b)(3) read in combination with the SARA-added CERCLA section 101 (35).
See infra notes 57-95 and accompanying text.
12. CERCLA section 101(35) defines "contractual relationship" as used in
CERCLA section 107(b)(3). Thus the innocent landowner defense is a third
party defense, distinguishable from the straightforward third party defense,
which remained unchanged by the SARA amendments.
13. See infra notes 57-95 and accompanying text.

14. See infra notes 96-202 and accompanying text.
15. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
16. Superfund Program; De Minimis Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Settlements,
54 Fed. Reg. 34,235 (1989) [hereinafter EPA Guidance]. While this Guidance was
not published in the Federal Register until August 18, 1989, it was dated June 6,
1989. See [Federal Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 41:3501-14 July 7, 1989).
17. See infra notes 203-233 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 209-212 and accompanying text.
19. Congressman Curt Weldon (R.- Pa.) has introduced a bill (H.R. 2787)

which would establish the minimum investigation that must be conducted in order to gain a presumption that the third party innocent landowner defense is
applicable, provided, of course, that the investigation did not turn up "red
flags" that would necessitate further inquiry. As of the date of this writing, this
bill has not been passed into law.
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
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with the innocent landowner defense as it was enacted in SARA.
It will ascertain practical methods of determining the requirements of the innocent landowner defense in the view of the EPA
and their expected response in light of these requirements. Finally, the aim of this Article will be to determine the utility and
practicality of the EPA's guidance to landowners concerning potential liability, de minimis settlements, and settlements with prospective purchasers of contaminated property.
II.

THE THIRD PARTY DEFENSE UNDER CERCLA

Congress passed CERCLA due to the enormous public outcry stemming from the discovery of an abandoned hazardous
waste site in the Love Canal neighborhood located in upstate New
York in 1980.20 It has little legislative history due to the fact that
Congress passed it in the final days of the lame duck session of
the outgoing ninety-sixth Congress. 2 ' Moreover, as a result of
this swift passage, courts were forced to struggle with congressional intent when attempting to interpret the provisions of the
statute. 22 In short, Congress' haste resulted in a piece of compro20. The Love Canal area gained notoriety due to health hazards posed by
the discovery of chemicals buried in the ground years before. At Love Canal,
Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporation had dumped 21,800 tons of toxic
wastes, including dioxin, into the canal. Gruson and Lindsey, Ex-Love Canal Families Get Checks, New York Times, Feb. 20, 1985, p. 81. Years after the disposal,
residents of the Love Canal neighborhood began to suffer physical injuries ranging from a variety of cancers and mental retardation to persistent rashes and
migraine headaches. Former residents settled with Hooker for a reported $20
million. See also No Health Effects From Love Canal, State Appointed Scientific Panel
Finds, 11 Env't Rep. (BNA) 948 (Oct. 31, 1980); Waste Control Issue Follows Air,
Water to Become Top U.S. Environmental Priority, 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 7 (May 3,
1985). The residents of Love Canal, however, were unable to obtain any legal
repose, in the way of forcing the cleanup of the toxic waste site, because the
federal statutory scheme contained no mechanisms to which they could turn. See
W. FRANK, SUPERFUND: LrITGATION AND CLEANUP 1 (1985). Moreover, public
awareness of the major public health hazards posed by the improper disposal of
hazardous wastes was increasing during this time. See L. GIBBS, LOVE CANAL, MY
STORY (1982). For a legislative interpretation of the events at Love Canal and
their effects on the legislative debate, see S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.,
8-10 (1980). For a more in depth discussion of the legislative history and the
motivation behind the enactment of SARA, see generally, Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 1 (1982).
21. See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D.
Ill. 1984). See generally Grad, supra note 20 at 1-2; ENvrL. L. INST., 1 Superfund: A
Legislative History, xiii-xxi (1982). The usual rules were suspended so that
amendments could not be added. Id. Unusual measures were employed in this
way to ensure the swift passage of CERCLA. Id.
22. See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp.
823, 839 n. 15 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ("The courts are once again placed in the unde-
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mise legislation with little or no legislative history or background.
CERCLA section 107(a) 23 identifies four categories of persons potentially liable for cleanup costs: (1) present owners and
operators of the facility; 24 (2) persons who owned or operated the
facility at the time of the disposal of the hazardous waste; 2 5 (3)
persons - commonly called "generators" - who arranged, by contract or otherwise, for the disposal or treatment at the facility of a
hazardous waste they owned or possessed; 26 and (4) persons who
transported a hazardous waste to the facility. 27 These four categories are commonly referred to as Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs). For purposes of the third party defense as it relates
to the later established innocent landowner defense, only those
28
PRPs identified in categories (1) and (2) are relevant.
While explicitly identifying the PRPs, Congress failed, as a
29
result of compromise, to provide a liability scheme in CERCLA.
sirable and onerous position of construing inadequately drawn legislation."); See
also, Bayko & Shore, supra note 6, at 24, col. 1.
CERCLA avoided dealing with major questions such as whether strict
liability should apply, what level of causality should the government
have to prove, should liability be joint and several, should liability be
retroactive, and should responsible parties have the right to seek contribution from other potentially responsible parties (PRPs). To no
one's surprise, the courts have played a critical role in crafting the
working parts of the statute.
Id.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
28. Both the third party defense as originally enacted in CERCLA section
107(b)(3) and the third party innocent landowner defense added by SARA in
CERCLA section 101 (35) can be maintained only by landowners or those operating the site as lessees. Lessees are entitled to claim both defenses available to
landowners. Thus, the "owner or operator" language in both CERCLA sections
107(a)(1) and (2) pertain to landowners and lessees. For reasons of simplicity,
this Article will refer only to landowners with the caveat that it is also meant to
include lessees. The "generators" and "transporters" in CERCLA sections
107(a)(1) and (2) cannot avail themselves of a CERCLA section 107(b)(3) third
party defense of any type because they would be unable to meet the requirements of the defense. The presence of a "contractual relationship" as defined in
CERCLA section 101(35)(A) would bar these PRPs from fulfilling the requirements of this defense. While there may be other defenses available to such
PRPs, the subject is beyond the scope of this Article and will not be discussed.
See United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (D.N.C. 1985) (electrical equipment
rebuilder denied third party defense because of presence of contractual relationship with transporter); but see Gibney, The PracticalSignificance of the Third Party
Defense Under CERCLA, 16 B.C. ENVrTL. L. AFF. REV. 383, 389 (1988) (suggesting
that generator may avail himself of third party defense if transporter had
dumped his generated wastes without his knowledge).
29. CERCLA's standards of liability are vague. For two early decisions ad-
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Courts have held that Congress intended liability to be strict,
joint, and several.3 0 This scheme, while missing from the stat32
ute, 3 ' was the subject of a last minute compromise in Congress.
Provisions were deleted from the Act mandating such joint and
several strict liability. 3 3 However, courts pointed to the definition
section of the Act 3 4 indicating that liability was to be determined
with reference to section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Con35
trol Act (commonly known as the Clean Water Act or CWA).
dressing the scope of CERCLA's liability provisions, see United States v. Wade,
577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (discussing shortcomings of statutory
language, as well as absence of sufficiently clear legislative history to guide
courts in interpreting scope of liability intended by Act); Pinhole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 286-87 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(favoring liberal interpretation of CERCLA and characterizing scope of liability
as "extremely broad" and available defenses as "extremely limited").
30. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985);
Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1442-43
(S.D. Fla. 1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326,
1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 80708 (S.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113 (D.N.J.
1983); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 n.4
(E.D. Pa. 1982). See also, Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1429 (S.D.
Ohio 1984) (supporting such liability scheme). Cf United States v. A. & F.
Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (S.D. I11.1984) (noting Senate's rejection of mandatory joint and several liability in favor of moderate approach which
doesn't prohibit joint and several liability).
The EPA has taken this position also, see ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY MEMORANDUM ON COST RECOVERY ACTIONS UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE
RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT (1983), reprinted in [Federal Laws]

Env't Rep. (BNA) 41:2861, 2865 (Oct. 14, 1983).
The issue of whether this is the correct liability scheme to be followed in
CERCLA actions has been the subject of a number of law review articles. See
generally Note,Joint and Several Liability under Superfund: The Plight of the Small Volume Hazardous Waste Contributor, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 1057 (1985); Moore and Kowalski, When Is One Generator Liable for Another's Waste?,33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 93
(1984-85); Note,Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 884, 905
(1984); Note,Joint and Several Liabilityfor Hazardous Waste Releases under Superfund,
68 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1982); Note, Superfund: ConscriptingIndustry Supportfor Environmental Cleanup, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 524, 544- 45 (1981); Comment, GeneratorLiability Under Superfundfor Clean-Up of Abandoned Hazardous Waste Dumpsites, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1229 (1982). See also Liability, Apportionment, Burden of Proof Called Key
Legal Issues in Superfund Suits, 14 Env't Rep. (BNA) 440 (July 22, 1983); Government
Responds to Industry Challenge to Joint and Several Liability Under Superfund, 14 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 138 (May 27, 1983).
31. Although the original bills presented in Congress contained a provision
imposing joint and several liability, the section was stricken from the Act before
it passed Congress. See Grad, supra note 20, at 19.
32. See generally W. FRANK, supra note 20, at 7.
33. See Grad, supra note 20, at 19.
34. CERCLA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601.
35. The Federal Pollution Control Act § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988)
(commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act) [hereinafter CWA]. Although
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Relying on this, courts imposed strict liability on responsible parties. 36 As a result, those individuals 3 7 who had purchased land
without knowing of the presence of hazardous waste on the property (i.e. innocent landowners) would be held strictly liable for the
38
cleanup costs.
The only defenses available to a PRP under CERCLA were
those statutory "third party" defenses3 9 provided by Congress in
CERCLA section 107(b). 40 It is here, and only here, 4 1 that a PRP
may look to avoid liability under CERCLA.4 2 The defenses cre43
ated in CERCLA section 107(b) are affirmative defenses,
thereby placing the burden of proof on the PRP who raises the
defense. CERCLA sections 107(b)(1) and (2) involve an act of
God 4 4 or an act of war4 5 and are not part of the consideration of
section 311 does not explicitly mention strict liability, courts have inferred such
liability from the language of the Act, which subjects certain parties to strict

liability unless they can successfully assert one of the defenses provided in the
Act. See United States v. M/V Big Sam, 681 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1982), on
petition for rehearing and suggestions for rehearing en bane, 693 F.2d 451 (5th Cir.
1982); United States v. LeBouef Bros. Towing Co., 621 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir.
1980), cert denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981); Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing
Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979).
36. Congress' reference to CWA section 311 is logical, because the same
defenses to liability found there also appear in CERCLA section 107(b). See also
S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980). The Senate committee that
introduced CERCLA noted that CERCLA actually had "roots in the liability and
funding provisions provided by the Clean Water Act of 1972." Id.
37. Parties liable under CERCLA section 107(a) include individuals as well
as corporations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(20)and 9601(21).
38. For a comprehensive overview of the practical effect and pertinent case
law of the imposition of liability on landowners due to their status as such and
the pertinent case law, see generally Glass, The Modern Snake in the Grass: An Examination of Real Estate & Commercial Liability Under Superfund & SARA and Suggested
Guidelinesfor the Practitioner,14 B.C. ENrvI. L. AFF. REV. 381 (1987).
39. So called because the defense requires that the placement or disposal of
the hazardous waste on the landowner's property have been done solely by a
third party. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
40. Id.
41. See United States v. Monsanto Company, 858 F.2d 160, 170 (4th Cir.
1988) (affirmatively acknowledging statutory language that liability under section 107(a) is "subject only to the defenses set forth" in section 107(b)) (emphasis in the original); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1062 (C.D.
Cal. 1987) (holding that. these statutory defenses are exclusive).
42. CERCLA section 107(b) reads in pertinent part: "There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise liable who can
establish .. " 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
43. Id.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1). An "act of God" is defined in CERCLA section
101(1). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(2).
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the third party defense. 46 To date, there has been little significant
47
litigation concerning these defenses.
CERCLA section 107(b)(3) was and is the heart of the third
party defense. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
(b) There shall be no liability.., for a person otherwise
liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous
substance and the damages resulting therefrom were
caused solely by:
....
(3) an act or omission of a third party other
than... one whose act or omission occurs in connec46. Both an act of God and an act of war are defenses distinct from the
third party defense. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
47. "Act of war" is not defined in the Act. Moreover, since the enactment
of CERCLA, the "act of war" defense has never been affirmatively pleaded by a
PRP.
In contrast, an "act of God" is defined as "an unanticipated grave natural
disaster or other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character, the effects of which could not have been prevented or avoided by
the exercise of due care or foresight." CERCLA § 101 (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1).
In Wagner Seed Co. v. Dagget, 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986), an agricultural
chemical company attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction against an order
by the EPA requiring a cleanup of a toxic waste spill from its warehouse. One of
the issues pleaded by the company in this action was that they were entitled to
the "act of God" defense, as contained in CERCLA section 107(b)(1), because
the release from their warehouse was caused by the burning down of the warehouse due to being struck by lightning. Id. at 313. The court never reached the
merits of this defense, holding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear
such a claim, as it constituted a pre-enforcement review of an EPA remedial action which is contrary to the policies underlying CERCLA. Id. at 317.
In a subsequent action to recover the costs incurred in the cleanup of the
toxic wastes released from the warehouse, the District Court for the District of
Columbia held that the company would be barred from recovering such costs
since they had completed a substantial amount of the cleanup prior to the enactment of SARA, which amended CERCLA section 106(b)(2) to allow for such
reimbursement from the Superfund. Wagner Seed Co. Inc. v. Bush, 709 F.
Supp. 249, 253 (D.D.C. 1989). Thus, the merits of the "act of God" defense
were never reached.
In another case where a defendant asserted the "act of God" defense, the
District Court for the Central District of California held that the heavy rainfalls
that the defendant alleged were responsible for the release of toxic wastes were
not an exceptional natural phenomenon and thus were not an "act of God"
within the meaning of the defense. United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp.
1053, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1987). The court stated that such "rains were foreseeable
based on normal climactic conditions and any harm caused by the rain could
have been prevented through design of proper drainage channels." Id. The
court further held that the rains were not the sole cause of the release. Id. (emphasis in the original).
Thus, while the "act of God" defense has been raised on at least two separate occasions, the merits of the defense were never addressed in Wagner and
were struck down in Stringfellow through observance of the statutory language
that defines the defense.
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tion with a contractual relationship, existing directly
or indirectly, with the defendant... if the defendant
establishes. . . that (a) he exercised due care with
respect to the hazardous substances concerned.. .in
light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b)
he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts
48
or omissions.
Thus, there were three elements contained within the third
party defense that a PRP had to establish in order to avoid liability. 49 To successfully assert a third party defense, a PRP had to
prove (1) there was no direct or indirect relationship, contractual
or otherwise, between the landowner/defendant (PRP) and the
third party; 50 (2) the landowner (PRP) exercised due care regarding the hazardous substances upon their discovery; 5' and (3) the
landowner (PRP) must have shown that he took precautions
52
against the acts or omissions of the third party.
The majority of confusion that arose from this statutory defense resulted in an attempt to ascertain congressional intent
through the term "contractual relationship.- 5 3 The basic question in the contractual relationship issue was whether or not instruments of transfer of ownership or interest in real estate such
as deeds, leases, and other forms of conveyance were to be included. 54 As construed by the courts, CERCLA may be used to
48. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
49. There are in reality four elements, because the release or threat of release of the hazardous substances must have been caused solely by a third party.
CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). For the sake of simplicity, this fact will
be assumed for purposes of this Article. It is important to note, however, that
this is the first hurdle a party must clear, by way of proof, if one plans on successfully asserting any third party defense. Without meeting this first requirement, consideration of the other requirements is unnecessary, as one will lose
on the "solely by a third party" proof problem. Id.
50. CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. "Contractual relationship" is used in defining the requirements of the
third party defense. CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3). A landowner who is claiming the third party defense has the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he had no direct or indirect contractual
relationship with the person responsible for the release or threatened release of
the hazardous substances. Id.
54. See United States v. Carolawn, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2124, 2129 (D.S.C.
1984) (denying summary judgement motion of defendant who held title to contaminated property for less than one hour); cf. Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc.
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impose liability for cleanup costs on landowners based solely on
their status as landowners.5 5 Many felt, however, that the reason
Congress supplied such a defense was to protect an innocent purchaser of land from significant liability for cleanup costs. 56 In enacting SARA in 1986, Congress set out to clarify these problems
and correct some perceived misconceptions.
III.
A.

THE INNOCENT LANDOWNER DEFENSE
UNDER SARA

Addition of the Innocent Landowner Defense

57
In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA by enacting SARA.
Along with changing several provisions of CERCLA, SARA increased the size of the Superfund and accelerated response activity. 58 Furthermore, Congress added the innocent landowner
defense provision 59 by defining certain terms used within the
CERCLA section 107(b)(3) third party defense 6° as enacted in the
original statute.
When drafting SARA, the House of Representatives raised
61
the issue of landowner liability in the form of an amendment.
The proposed amendment would have added an entirely new paragraph to CERCLA section 107, dealing specifically with land-

v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir. 1988) (former landowner who
held title to land after contamination held not to be amongst classes of potential
defendants contemplated in CERCLA section 107(a)).
55. Historically, legislation enacted to protect the public health has been
construed to permit the effectuation of the regulatory purpose despite the resulting hardship to individual defendants. See e.g., United States v. Park, 421
U.S. 658, 671-72 (1975); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943);
United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 666 (3d Cir. 1984).
56. This would seem accurate in light of the formation of the innocent landowner defense after SARA. See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15
(1985), reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3038 (one of SARA's
purposes was protection of interests and rights of those who may be held liable
for such cleanups).
57. Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1614 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(Supp. V 1987)). For a comprehensive account of the legislative history of
SARA, see generally, Atkeson, Goldberg, Ellrod & Connors, An Annotated Legislative
History of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 16
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envd. L. Inst.) 10860 (1986).
58. See Grad, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
59. CERCLA § 101(35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35). Added by SARA, this subsection is the basis of the innocent landowner defense when read in conjunction
with the third party defense, CERCLA section 107(b)(3), which remained unchanged by SARA. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
61. 131 CONG. REC. H11,158 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985).
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owner liability. 62 This amendment would have made available an
affirmative defense to a landowner who was able to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he had purchased the property in question absent actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition, and thereafter did not contribute to its
existence by permitting the disposal, storage, or treatment of hazardous wastes. 63
In the course of debate, several members of Congress continued to assert that innocent landowners must not be held liable for
cleanup operations. They expressed concern that CERCLA, as it
existed, failed to afford the desired protection. 64 The sponsor of
the proposed amendment 65 acknowledged that it was unclear
whether a landowner who satisfied the requirements of the proposed amendments could be found liable under CERCLA as it
had been construed by the courts in the past. 6 6 However, this
amendment was considered necessary to clear up that uncertainty. 67 This thinking was undoubtedly fueled by decisions hold62. The text of the proposed amendment was as follows:
(m) LANDOWNER LIABILITY- There shall be no liability under
subsection (a)(1) of this section for a person otherwise liable who can
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he(1) is the owner of the real property on or in which the facility is
located;
(2) did not conduct or permft the generation, transportation,
storage, treatment, or disposal of any hazardous substance at the
facility, the release or threatened release of which causes the incurrence of a response cost;
(3) did not contribute to the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance at the facility through any act or omission; and
(4) did not acquire the property with actual or constructive
knowledge that the property was used prior to the acquisition for
the generation, transportation, storage, treatment, or disposal of
any hazardous substance.

Id.
63. These are the same requirements that are in the innocent landowner
defense as enacted by the addition of CERCIA section 101(35). 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(35).
64. In the course of debate Representative Breaux stated the following:
It looks like we should try to craft some type of provision that really
protects the innocent landowner who has not done anything to put the
waste there, or would have no way of knowing that the waste was there,
and somehow wind up down the road years in advance that the property has toxic wastes on it. That person should not be held liable.
131 CONG. REC. H11,158 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985).
65. Representative Frank.
66. 131 CONG. REC. H 11,158 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985).
67. "While an argument could be made that we do not need this amendment, that it is already taken care of in the law, courts have differed on that
point." Id. at H 11,159 (statement of Representative Daub).
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ing landowners liable for cleanup costs based upon their status as
landowners.
The conference committee's substitute amendment, which
ultimately was passed, took a less direct approach than the House,
but in the hope of reaching a similar result. 68 Rather than provid-

ing a separate defense, a new definition was added to clarify the
term "contractual relationship" contained in CERCLA section
70
107(b)(3) 6 9 with regard to acts and omissions of third parties.
This new definition works in conjunction with the third party
71
defense.
"Contractual relationship" was defined to include land contracts, deeds or other instruments transferring title or possession. 7 2 This definition thus put to rest the question of whether
one in the chain of title is in a contractual relationship with a previous owner, thereby unequivocally rendering him a PRP. 73 A
passive landowner, therefore, could be made subject to liability
under CERCLA.
However, this same section provides an exception to this liability,7 4 created by such a contractual relationship, under limited
circumstances. Under this section, a landowner is liable:
[U]nless the real property.

.

.

was acquired by the de-

fendant after the disposal or the placement of the hazardous substances on, in, or at the facility, and one or
more of the circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or
(iii) is also established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility
68. The requirements of the amendment and the innocent landowner defense as enacted (the conference approach) are essentially the same. See supra
notes 61-63 and accompanying text.

69. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
70. CERCLA § 101(35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35).
71. The added subsection states, "The term contractual relationship, for
Id. § 101(35), 42
the purpose of section 107(b)(3) of this title includes ....
U.S.C. § 9601(35).
72. Id. § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A).
73. By defining "contractual relationship" to include deeds, leases, and
other instruments transferring title or possession, a landowner who has
purchased contaminated land may not avail himself of the pre-SARA third party
defense because of this relationship. Instead, he must fulfill the requirements of
CERCLA section 101(35)(A). Thus, he is a PRP as that term relates to CERCLA
section 107(a).
74. A landowner in a contractual relationship with the previous owner(s)

can be excepted from liability upon fulfilling the requirements of the "unless"

clause. CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A).
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the defendant did not know and had no reason to
know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which
acquired the facility by escheat, or through any
other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through
the exercise of eminent domain authority by
purchase or condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheri75
tance or bequest.
This added clause of section 101 when read in conjunction
with CERCLA section 107(b)(3) came to be known as the third
party "innocent landowner" defense. Thus, a purchaser of property who is able to establish that he "did not know and had no
reason to know" of the existence of hazardous wastes on the
site, 7 6 and that he has satisfied the requirements of CERCLA sections 107(b)(3)(a) and (b), 7 7 will not be held liable for cleanup
costs under the amended CERCLA statute. In effect what the
"unless" clause does in this scheme is allow a landowner who has
a contractual relationship with the responsible party (which in the
pre-SARA era would have defeated the assertion of a third party
defense) 7 8 to jump back into the third party defense of CERCLA
section 107(b)(3) by having the contractual relationship which is
not a contractual relationship by the statute. 79 What Congress did
was define the term "contractual relationship" to include certain
legal relationships unless the party could establish certain other
requirements. 8 0 It is a strange and cumbersome, not to mention
extremely confusing, way to accomplish such an aim-a separate
addition to CERCLA section 107(b) would have been eminently
75. Id.
76. CERCLA § 101(35)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i).
77. The last sentence of subsection 101 (35)(A) states the following: "In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish that he has
satisfied the requirements of section 107(b)(3)(a) and (b)." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601 (35)(A). Thus, a defendant must still prove all the requirements of CERCLA section 107(b)(3), using CERCIA section 101(35)(A) only to get around
the contractual relationship bar in CERCLA section 107(b)(3).
78. There was no exception to the contractual relationship bar in the statute prior to SARA. CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982).
79. While it may seem odd to define "contractual relationship" and then
say if one meets certain conditions in connection with that contractual relationship, then it will not be considered such, this is precisely what the statute does.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A).
80. Id.
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clearer and easier to grasp."'
In order for a defendant to prove that he did not know or
have any reason to know of the presence of hazardous substances,
Congress, in CERCLA section 101(35)(B), 8 2 established an all appropriate inquiry standard.8 3 This inquiry examines the previous
ownership and uses of the property consistent with good coms4
mercial and customary practice in an effort to minimize liability.
The Conference Report suggests that parties engaged in
commercial transactions should be held to a higher standard of
inquiry than those involved in private residential transactions.8 5
In the event that an owner acquires knowledge of a release or
threatened release, he will be subject to liability if he transfers the
site without disclosure of this information.8 6 CERCLA section
107(35)(B) provides further criteria to be used in determining if a
7
landowner has conducted an all appropriate inquiry.
B.

De Minimis Settlements and Landowners

SARA contained an additional provision applicable to landowners which may serve to eliminate some of the perceived injustices contained in the original statute. In CERCLA section
122(g), 8 the statute directs the EPA to promulgate regulations
for settlements with de minimis PRPs. To qualify as de minimis, a
landowner must not have permitted the generation, transportation, storage, treatment, or disposal of any hazardous substance
81. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.

82. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B).
83. CERCLA section 101(35)(B) states the following:
(B) To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided in clause (i) of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant
must have undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriateinquiry
into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with

good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability. For purposes of the preceding sentence the court shall take into
account any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable

information about the property, the obviousness of the presence or
likely presence of contamination at the property, and the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.

42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (emphasis added).
84. Id.
85. JOINT EXPLANATORY

STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE,

H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 187-88 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3280-81.

86. CERCLA § 101(35)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C).
87. See supra, note 83.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 96 2 2(g).
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at the site and must not have contributed to the release of the
hazardous substances.8 9 This provision authorizes the EPA to
settle promptly with de minimis PRPs, and then require that the
bulk of the costs be borne by those primarily responsible for the
hazardous condition. 90 In this way, the liability scheme provides
for some correlation between the amount of liability imposed and
the relative degree of contribution to the hazardous condition,
thereby mitigating the otherwise harsh operation ofjoint and several strict liability.
It has been suggested that SARA creates a two-tiered system
of landowner liability. 9 1 Landowners may escape liability completely if they are able to satisfy the requirements of CERCLA
section 107(b) in conjunction with CERCLA section 101(35).
Those who are unable to prove the absence of actual or constructive knowledge now have the option of qualifying as a de minimis
PRP. The effect of the EPA's published guidance on this issue,
and its impact on the innocent landowner defense, will be discussed in Part V.
The enactment of SARA created a clearer scheme by which a
PRP could establish a statutory defense to CERCLA liability. In
the alternative, a PRP, under SARA, could look to the de minimis
settlement provisions for recourse. The statutory requirements
needed in order for a PRP to establish an affirmative defense are
the following:
(1) the hazardous substances involved in the release or
threat of release from the property must have been
placed on the property by a third party other than an employee, agent, or someone in direct or indirect contractual relationship (such as a previous owner in the chain
of title, a tenant, sublessee, etc.) with the landowner; OR
(2) (a) if such third party was a previous owner of the
property in the chain of title with the current landowner,
the current landowner must also show that he acquired
the property after the disposal of the hazardous waste,
and (b) the current landowner did not know and had no
reason to know of the hazardous substances that are the
subject of the release by having made all appropriate in89. Id.
90. This way the EPA may focus its resources on those primarily responsible for the release or threatened release of the hazardous substance(s).
91. See Bayko & Shore, supra note 6, at 27 n. 33.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991

15

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 6

158

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. II: p. 143

quiry into the previous ownership and uses of property
consistent with good commercial or customary practice;
(3) the current landowner exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substances upon their discovery;
and
(4) the current landowner took precautions against
foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and
the consequences that could foreseeably result from
92
them.
The straightforward third party defense that is unchanged by the
passage of SARA would comprise (1), (3), and (4), while the innocent landowner defense (a type of third party defense) would
comprise (2), (3), and (4).93 Though the innocent landowner
scheme may seem clear, its treatment and interpretation by the
courts has proven otherwise. 94 The straightforward third party
defense, unchanged by SARA, is a different analysis and beyond
95
the scope of this Comment.
IV. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE INNOCENT
LANDOWNER DEFENSE
Since the passage of SARA and the creation of the innocent
landowner defense, there has been little case law involving statutory interpretation of the defense. The few cases that have dealt
with the issue have shown a lack of consistency as well as a weak
grasp of precisely what the defense comprises. Courts have, for
the most part, shown an inability to separate the third party innocent landowner defense from a straightforward third party defense. While this has not led to any erroneous decisions (since
the party asserting the innocent landowner defense would have
been unable to maintain the defense even upon proper analysis),
it bears scrutiny in order to avoid any possible future judicial
miscarriages.
92. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) and CERC[A §§ 101(35)(A),
(B), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A), (B).
93. At the threshold, the defendant asserting the innocent landowner defense must prove that the release or threatened release is due solely to the actions
of a third party. Id. § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
94. See infra notes 96-202 and accompanying text.
95. For a more thorough analysis of the third party defense under CERCLA, see generally Gibney, The PracticalSignificance of the Third Party Defense Under

CERCLA, 16 B.C. ENVT. L. AFF. REV. 383 (1988); Marcus, The Price of Innocence:
Landowner Liability Under CERCLA and SARA, 6 TEMP. ENVrL. L. & TECH. J. 117,
126-29 (1987); Levitas & Hughes, Hazardous Waste Issues in Real Estate Transactions, 38 MERCER L. REV. 581 (1987).
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In United States v. Monsanto Co. ,96 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected the defendant's claimed innocent landowner defense. 9 7 The court properly ruled that the defendant had not carried its burden of such an affirmative defense. 9 8 Yet, while their
holding was sound, their reasoning was misleading. Although the
court characterized the defendant as reasserting the third party
innocent landowner defense on appeal, 99 the defendant was in reality asserting a straightforward third party defense. The innocent landowner defense could not have been raised by the
defendant because the Monsanto Co. owned the land at the time
the hazardous waste was deposited.'t ° While this fact is not fatal
to a straight third party defense,' 0 ' it will prohibit a party from
pleading the innocent landowner defense.
The main feature of the innocent landowner defense is that
the hazardous waste has already been deposited on the land at the
time of purchase.10 2 This factor was not explicitly recognized by
the court. While the court reached the correct conclusion in its
ruling, 0 3 it should have made clear that it was not a third party
innocent landowner defense they were rejecting, but a pre-SARA
third party defense. Strangely, the court footnoted to CERCLA
section 101(35) 104 which contains the innocent landowner defense but held simply that such an exception merely signalled
Congress' intent to impose liability on those landowners failing to
96. 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
97. Id. at 169.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 166-167.
100. If a landowner is the owner of the property at the time hazardous substances are deposited there, he will be limited to the pre-SARA third party defense contained in CERCLA section 107(b)(3). 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3). This is
a requirement of the innocent landowner defense as set out in CERCLA section
101 (35) (A). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (A). The motivation for enacting the innocent
landowner defense in SARA was to allow a defense to liability to those landowners who acquired the property after the hazardous substances were already on
the site. As such, the defense is limited to those owners who acquire property
after the disposal of the hazardous materials has occurred.
101. If a landowner can prove the elements of CERCLA section 107(b)(3),
he will not be liable despite the fact that the hazardous material was deposited
on his property while he was the owner. This provision protects landowners
from "midnight dumpers" and others beyond control and without knowledge or
consent. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
102. CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A).
103. The defendant lessors in this case should have pleaded the straightforward third party defense because they had a lease agreement with the responsible party, Columbia Organic Chemical Company, which acts as a bar to the
innocent landowner defense. Id. § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
104. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 168 n. 14.
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satisfy its express requirements. 0 5 As such, the court exhibited a
misunderstanding of the distinction between the third party innocent landowner defense and the straightforward third party
defense.
In State of Washington v. Time Oil Co., 106 another federal court
was faced with a defendant asserting the innocent landowner defense. 10 7 And again, while reaching the correct result, 0 8 the district court's reading of the statute regarding the defense was
flawed and showed a lack of understanding of the hybrid defense.
Unlike the Monsanto court, the Time Oil court properly identified
the innocent landowner defense as stemming from CERCLA section 101(35).109 The problem the court then encountered was
that while the innocent landowner defense requires that the hazardous wastes be placed there solely by a third party, it can be a
party with whom the landowner has a contractual relationship. If,
however, the landowner has a contractual relationship with the
third party polluter, he must have purchased the land after the
hazardous waste was already present on the land" 10 and satisfy the
remaining requirements of CERCLA sections 101(35)(A) and
(B) I" ' (thereby voiding the contractual relationship), and also satisfy the requirements of CERCLA sections 107(b)(3)(a) and
(b)." l 2 The third party defense, on the other hand, requires that
the hazardous waste be placed there solely by a third party who
has no contractualrelationship (at any time) with the landowner."13
The court, in discussing Time Oil's burden of proof in asserting
the affirmative defense of innocent landownership stated in pertinent part:
[I]t becomes Time Oil's burden in asserting the affirmative (b)(3) defense to present evidence sufficient to show
the Court that there remain specific factual issues as to
whether the releases of hazardous substances were
caused solely by an act or omission of someone other
than a Time Oil employee or agent, or someone other
105. Id. at 169.
106. 687 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
107. Id. at 530.
108. The defendant would have been unable to successfully claim either the
straightforward third party defense or the innocent landowner defense.
109. Time Oil, 687 F. Supp. at 530.
110. CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A).
111. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A), (B).
112. Id.
113. CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
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than a person acting in connection with a contractual relationship with Time Oil. 114
While this statement is correct, its misleading tendency is
readily apparent. In the innocent landowner defense the presence of a contractual relationship will not defeat the defense per
se.1 15 Once a party proves the remaining requirements of CERCLA section 101(35)(A) he will not be considered to be in a contractual relationship with the third party." 6 The court in this
passage does not distinguish between Time Oil not being in a
contractual relationship with the responsible party in any form (a
straightforward third party defense) or Time Oil not having a
contractual relationship with the responsible party by virtue of
fulfilling the further requirements of CERCLA section
101(35)(A). If the latter, the contractual relationship would be
rendered nonexistent for purposes of a CERCLA section
107(b)(3) defense. Again, this is a further example of a court being unclear as to which type of third party defense is being referred to.
The court then proceeded further to muddy the waters by
holding that Time Oil could not successfully assert the defense
because it could not offer proof that the release of the hazardous
waste was caused solely by a third party." 7 One wonders why the
court would not begin and end the opinion with this judgement,
since Time Oil could not clear the first hurdle of any third party
defense in CERCLA section 107(b)(3).11 8
Finally, to render the opinion even more confusing, the court
discussed evidence that the last operator on the site was Time
Oil's sublessee." 9 There was substantial evidence that this sublessee's conduct at the time in question was extremely sloppy and
that they allowed heavy black oil to leak onto the ground at the
site and kept the property in a constant state of disrepair. 20 This
behavior was so destructive that Time Oil sought and obtained a
114. Time Oil, 687 F. Supp. at 532 (citations omitted).
115. CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A). This is the purpose
of the "unless" clause. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
116. Id.
117. Time Oil, 687 F. Supp. at 532.
118. In order to avail oneself of any third party defense, one must prove
that the presence on the property of the hazardous substance was due solely to a
third party (hence the name "third party" defense). CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3). This element must be proven without exception in order
to prevail in averring such a defense. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
119. Time Oil, 687 F. Supp. at 532-33.
120. Id. at 533.
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preliminary injunction against the sublessee in order to prohibit
such conduct. 121
Under such a scenario, Time Oil would be unable to plead
the innocent landowner defense on the basis of their being in a
contractual relationship with the responsible party after their acquisition of the property. 122 Of course, they could not plead a
straightforward third party defense, either, since their status as
lessor would render them in a contractual relationship 23 with the
responsible party. The court never explicitly addresses this, and
explains only that Time Oil did not carry its burden for purposes
of a summary judgement motion. In the final sentence of the
opinion the court states the following:
It is enough to note that the innocent landowner defense
cannot be available to Defendant Time Oil, when Time
Oil has failed to present specific facts to indicate that
some other party having no employment, subsidiary, or
contractual connection with Time Oil is solely responsible
for releasing all of the hazardous substances which have
124
come to be found on the subject property.
While this statement, standing alone, is again not inaccurate,
the court should point out that the presence of a contractual connection can be voided by fulfilling the further requirements of
CERCLA section 101(35)(A).1 25 As such, the presence of a contractual connection will not be fatal per se to an innocent landowner defense because it can be rendered a nullity. Thus, a party
may successfully assert a CERCLA section 107(b)(3) third party
defense notwithstanding that, technically, there was a contractual
26
connection between the landowner and the responsible party.
A reading of the above passage from the Time Oil opinion, shows
121. Id.
122. CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A). A feature of the innocent landowner defense is that the contractual relationship entered into between the landowner and the responsible party was entered into after the
disposal of the hazardous substance on the property by the responsible party.
See supra note 100.
123. Id.
124. Time Oil, 687 F. Supp. at 533 (emphasis in the original).
125. If Time Oil could have proven the remaining elements of CERCIa section 101(35) (A) the contractual relationship bar would be removed. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601 (35)(A). The "solely" by a third party element can not be avoided, however. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A). See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying
text.
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one would be unable to ascertain this. 12 7 The innocent landowner defense was constructed to afford relief to those landowners who did have a contractual connection to the party responsible
for placing the hazardous waste on the property. 28 Consequently, while it is true that a third party defense requires that the
hazardous waste be placed on the property in question solely by a
third party, the distinguishing feature of the innocent landowner
defense is that even one who does have a contractual relationship
with the responsible party (as that term is defined by Congress)
may still avoid liability through the "unless" clause in CERCLA
section 101(35) (A) by having the contractual relationship ignored
for purposes of CERCLA section 107(b)(3). Not unlike Monsanto,
the court in Time Oil failed to adequately differentiate between a
straightforward pre-SARA third party defense 12 9 and the hybrid
post-SARA third party innocent landowner defense. While these
courts' respective failures were not fatal in either of these cases, it
is incumbent on the courts to accurately define and delineate the
exact characteristics of the third party defenses in order to provide guidance to all involved in what is often a serious and ex50
tremely expensive proceeding.'
In another recent decision, the Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan also displayed a weak grasp of the
subtle technical nuances present in the third party innocent landowner defense. In In re Sterling Steel TreatingInc.,'3' the court discussed whether or not the party attempting to avoid liability could
assert the third party defense.' 3 2 Yet in their analysis they combined aspects of both a straightforward third party defense and an
innocent landowner defense. The court began its analysis by correctly characterizing a third party defense as exonerating from liability any party who can prove that the risk posed by a hazardous
substance was due to the act of a third party with whom the defendant had no agency or contractual connection. l3 3 The court
then proceeded beyond a straightforward third party defense
127. On reading this passage, one receives the impression that a contractual relationship with a third party responsible for releasing the hazardous substances will defeat an innocent landowner defense.
128. See supra notes 55, 63, 66, 100 and accompanying text.

129. CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982).
130. "The average cost of a Superfund cleanup today is $20 million." Lecture by Edwin Erickson, EPA Regional Administrator, Region III, Villanova University School of Law (Nov. 2, 1989).
131. 94 Bankr. 924 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1989).
132. d. at 928-30.
133. Id. at 929.
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34
analysis and shifted to an innocent landowner defense analysis.'
The court stated the following:

A landowner who innocently or involuntarily acquired
contaminated property may invoke the third party defense if he establishes that he inquired into the previous
ownership and uses of the property, that the inquiry did
not reveal that hazardous wastes had been disposed of
on the site and that he therefore had no reason to know
i3 5
that the property was contaminated.
These are the requirements of CERCLA section 101(35) (A) that
need to be established in order to have a contractual connection
ignored for purposes of a third party defense.' 3 6 While the court
was correct in its decision that the landowner in this case could
not successfully carry the affirmative defense claimed, 3 7 the court
erroneously characterized it as a straightforward third party defense. While the court was again correct in its belief that the lack
of a contractual relationship is the first requirement for a third
party defense,' 3 8 their focus shifted to the third party innocent
landowner defense without making clear that they were doing so.
The analysis should change when determining whether a
party can maintain an innocent landowner defense in that the emphasis will be on nullifying a contractual relationship for purposes
of maintaining a third party defense.' 3 9 This question is to be
answered using the factors dictated by Congress in CERCIA sections 101(35)(A) and (B). This shift in analysis should be recognized and addressed by a court in a proceeding involving
potentially enormous liability.140 Without such thorough analysis
landowners will themselves become confused as to whether or
not they have a legitimate defense when faced with such liability.
Additionally, the parties asserting the defense in Sterling Steel
purchased the property after the placement of the hazardous
134. Id.
135. Sterling Steel, 94 Bankr. at 929 (citations omitted).

136. See supra notes 73, 76, 78 and accompanying text.
137. The defendant could not have satisfied the all appropriate inquiry
standard of CERCLA section 101(35) (A) because there was ample evidence that
the defendant knew, or had reason to know, of the presence of hazardous substances on the property prior to the purchase. Sterling Steel, 94 Bankr. at 930.
138. CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3). See supra notes 49, 118
and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 130.
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waste.' 4 1 The fact that the defendants had a contractual connection with the responsible party would prevent them from asserting a straightforward third party defense.' 42 The court, in its
handling of this issue, never explicitly acknowledged this, nor that
such a connection would-limit the landowner to asserting a third
party innocent landowner defense. 143 Though arguably this distinction may seem insignificant, it is submitted that the courts
have a duty to clearly delineate and rule on what the applicable
law is in an area that, at the present time, is fraught with uncertainty and filled with landowners and potential landowners fearful
of Superfund liability 144 who require guidance in this area of the
law.
In another development concerning the third party innocent
landowner defense, an even larger blanket of confusion was
thrown over the meaning of the requirements of the defense. In
an opinion concerning a present landowner asserting the innocent landowner defense, the District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania, in United States v. Serafini,14 5 struggled with the
meaning of the all appropriate inquiry standard as delineated in
CERCIA section 101 (35) (B).' 4 6 The all appropriate inquiry standard is designed to aid the court in determining the requirement
of the innocent landowner defense that a landowner "did not
know or have reason to know that any hazardous substance which
is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of
on the property." 4 7 The court, in the course of its opinion, completely obfuscates the meaning of the all appropriate inquiry
standard.
Serafini involved present landowners of a 225 acre tract of undeveloped land, with approximately 1,141 fifty-five gallon drums
openly scattered about the site.' 48 Upon investigation, the EPA
discovered that 847 of these drums contained hazardous substances as defined by CERCLA. 14 9 The United States brought
141. Sterling Steel, 94 Bankr. at 926-27.
142. CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3). A contractual relationship will bar a party from establishing a straightforward third party defense.
143. Sterling Steel, 94 Bankr. at 928-30.
144. See supra note 130.
145. 706 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
146. Id. at 351-53.
147. CERCLA § 101(35)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i).
148. 706 F. Supp. at 348.
149. Id. Additionally, 105 drums contained non-hazardous substances, and
189 were contaminated by residues. Id. Hazardous substances for purposes of
CERCLA are defined by section 101(14). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
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suit seeking injunctive relief and recovery of response costs
against various parties, including the present landowner. 50 After
a number of defendants had negotiated with the government to
complete the remedial work at the site,' 5' the government filed a
summary judgement motion on liability against the defendants
(the present landowners), 5 2 the result of which formed the basis
for the opinion issued by the court.
After admitting that the drums were visible to the naked eye
at the time of purchase,153 the defendant contended that this fact
was not enough to establish that they knew or had reason to know
154
that the hazardous substance had been deposited on the site.
They stated that the purchase involved the inspection of various
maps to determine the location of the property without the re55
quirement of an on-site inspection.
In response, the government contended that in no way could
150. Serafini, 706 F. Supp. at 348. The government instituted the action on
November 10, 1986. Id.
151. Id. The consent decree entered into between the United States and
four defendants called for those four defendants to complete the remedial work
undertaken by the government at the site. Id.
152. Id. The government's complaint was filed against defendants Serafini,
Bernabei, Buttafoco and Naples, individually and against the Empire Contracting Company, a partnership wholly owned by the individual defendants. Id.
The Empire Contracting Company had purchased the tract of land in Taylor
Borough, near Scranton, Pennsylvania, on December 12, 1969, from the Parmoff Corporation. Id. Until at least March 31, 1968, Parmoff had leased a portion
of the land to the City of Scranton for the operation of a sanitary landfill and
waste disposal site on this leased portion. Id.
153. Serafini, 706 F. Supp. at 352. The defendant in this case admitted such
by failure to respond to the government's request for admissions that "on December 12, 1969, the cylindrical metal drums were visible to the naked eye." Id.
The court had earlier ruled that by operation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
36(b) the failure on defendant's part to answer conclusively established that at
the time defendant purchased the land the abandoned drums were plainly visible. Id. at 352 n. 7.
154. Id. at 353. The defendant indicated that at the time of purchase they
did not conduct an on-site inspection, nor did they have any reason to do so. Id.
155. Id. The defendant asserted that it was not until 1980 or 1981, when
the EPA conducted its investigation, that they became aware of the existence of
photographs of the site in 1968 showing the presence of the barrels on the site,
placing them on-site prior to the defendant's purchase of the property. Id. Defendant's counsel had sent these photographs to the EPA on November 17,
1982, as proof that the barrels were there prior to their client's purchase and
therefore the barrels were not their client's responsibility. Id. at 352. The bizarre twist is that the photographs were produced by the defendant's counsel as
proof that the hazardous waste was present on the property prior to the
purchase, yet defendant claimed to have no knowledge of these photos prior to
the EPA's investigation in 1981 or 1982, at least 13 years after these photos were
allegedly taken. Id. Where, then, did these photos come from? The court never
addressed this issue.
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SARA's all appropriate inquiry standard be satisfied by a landowner who does not visually inspect the land or fails to inquire
about its condition or past history. 156 The position taken by the
government was that this type of willful blindness could never ful57
fill such an affirmative duty.'
Incredibly, after analyzing the evidence before it, the court
held that it could not reach the conclusion that the defendant's
inaction was inappropriate under the facts of the case.' 5 8 One
can only wonder what the court would consider "all appropriate
inquiry."' 1 59 The holding in this opinion becomes even more confusing when one considers that Congress, in the legislative history
of SARA, had intended commercial transactions, such as here, to
be held to the highest level of inquiry under this standard.16 0 The
type of willful blindness shown by the defendant in this case, and
the court's failure to condemn such inaction, seemingly disregards the all appropriate inquiry standard as applied to the third
party innocent landowner defense. As such, it is submitted that
this opinion is erroneous or, at the very least, legally
questionable.' 6 '
156. Id. at 353. The government argued that SARA's innocent landowner
defense does not protect the owner who fails to inspect the land or fails to inquire into its current condition or past history. Id.
157. Serafini, 706 F. Supp. at 353.
158. Id. How the court could reach this conclusion in light of the evidence
presented is a puzzle. Cf.Anderson, Will the Meek Even Want the Earth?, 38 MERCER L. REV. 535, 539-40 (1987) ("only by inspection for the presence of hazardous substances can the landowner determine what precaution, if any, are
necessary... a property possessor who fails to inspect or ignores signs of potential hazards may be held liable for cleanup costs, even though another created"
the hazard); see also Schwenke, EnvironmentalLiabilitiesImposed on Landowners, Tenants, and Lenders-How FarCan and Should They Extend?, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10361, 10362 (1988) ("in 1987, almost no one can qualify as an 'innocent
landowner'.., unless and until they have gone through a complete environmental audit or assessment with respect their property").
159. While cited, one wonders what the court considered the language of
CERCLA section 101(35)(B) to mean when, in determining if all appropriate
inquiry was made in a specific situation, a court shall consider "commonly
known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and
the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection." 706 F.
Supp. at 352. The court seemed to completely disregard this specific language.
160. See JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMrTTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 187-88 (1986), reprintedin
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3280-81.
161. In a later proceeding, the same court and the same judge held that the
government's supplemental summary judgement motion, on the same ground as
the previous discussion, would again be denied. United States v. Serafini, 711 F.
Supp. 197, 198 (M.D. Pa. 1988). The government submitted two experts' affidavits that it would be inconceivable to purchase a 225-acre tract of land in 1969
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In contrast, another case involving the all appropriate inquiry
standard was recently decided by the District Court for the Northern District of California. In Wickand Oil Terminals v. Asarco,
Inc.,162 the court held that the landowner/defendant had not fulfilled his duty to make all appropriate inquiry under the "know or
have reason to know" test set forth in CERCLA section
101(35).163 Consequently, the defendant was denied the use of
the third party innocent landowner defense.' 6 4
The court began its analysis of the innocent landowner defense by correctly determining that since the defendant, as vendee/lessee of the site, had a contractual relationship with the
responsible parties, it would have to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that at the time of the acquisition of the property
it "did not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous
substances which is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility."'16 5 The defendant
must establish this lack of knowledge to maintain the innocent
landowner defense otherwise the contractual relationship could
not be overcome and would bar a third party defense under CERCLA section 107(b)(3).1 6 6
The evidence presented in this case overwhelmingly demonstrated that the defendant knew of the presence of the hazardous
substances on the property.16 7 In considering this evidence the
court applied the all appropriate inquiry standard 68 in order to
establish whether the defendant had met its burden of proof on
the "know or had reason to know" test.' 69 The application of this
standard in this manner was consistent with the language of the
statute.
Interestingly, the court went further than considering only
what the defendant "knew" in applying the all appropriate inwithout first inspecting it. Id. The defendants countered with two experts' affidavits that it was not the customary or good commercial practice in 1969 for a
prospective purchaser to inspect a large tract of land. Id. Thus, the court held
that there remained a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id.
162. 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20855 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
163. Id. at 20856.
164. Id.
165. Id. This properly analyzes the innocent landowner defense, whereby
one must look to the requirements of CERCLA section 101(35) in order to nullify a contractual relationship between the landowner and the responsible party.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35).
166. See supra notes 73, 76, 78 and accompanying text.
167. Wickland, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20856.
168. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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quiry standard. 70 The court held that even if the defendant
could prove that it did not possess the information regarding the
hazardous substances that the evidence tended to show the information was readily available to the defendant and the defendant's
failure to obtain this information would also render it unable to
meet the all appropriate inquiry standard.' 7 ' The Wickland court,
unlike the Serafini court, recognized that Congress intended that
those engaged in commercial transactions be held to a higher
standard of inquiry than those engaged in private residential
transactions. 72 The court further held that the defendant's emphasis on what it "knew" was misplaced. 173 This, then, gave
meaning to the "had reason to know" prong of the test, another
facet of the statute that the Serafini court neglected in its analysis.
Thus, the district court meaningfully applied the statutory
language of CERCLA as Congress intended. It is extremely difficult to reconcile Wickland with the Serafini decision. It is submitted that the Wickland opinion will serve as a more useful guide for
landowners through its analysis of the all appropriate inquiry
standard of the third party innocent landowner defense.
Another more recent decision dealing with the innocent
landowner defense is United States v. Pacific Hide and Fur Depot,
Inc.. 174 In this case, the District Court for the District of Idaho
conducted a thorough analysis of the innocent landowner defense. Here, the facts involved a corporation formed in 1949 by
one Samuel McCarty, to operate a scrap metal recycling business
on property located in Pocatello, Idaho. 7 5 McCarty and his wife
died in the 1960s, leaving the stock in the corporation to their
children, two of whom continued the operations of the company,
while a third child owned stock but did not participate in the management of the company. 176 The company redeemed the fourth
77

child's stock. 1

During the 1970s, capacitors containing polychlorinated bi170. Wickland, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20856.
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 10 and 85 and accompanying text.
173. Wickland, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20856.
174. 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho 1989).
175. Id. at 1343.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1343. The company remained in existence until 1982, by which
time one of the children running the company had died and the other had given
his stock to his children, none of whom had been active in running or managing
the company. Id. at 1344-45. The shareholders then dissolved the corporation
and distributed the assets in return for the redemption of their stock. Id. at 1344.
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phenyls (PCBs), many of which later leaked, were discarded into a
pit on the property. 178 The EPA used Supeffund monies to effect
the cleanup of the site, and then sued the only child who remained a stockholder and the remaining stockholders for reimbursement, on the theory that they were both the present
landowners and past landowners of the facility. 179 The defendants raised the third party innocent landowner defense.1 8 0
The court, after determining that the innocent landowner defense was an amalgam of CERCLA sections 107(b)(3) and
101(35)(A) and (B)' 8 1 and walking through the language of each
section as it defined the defense, held that the defendants 8 2 were
all entitled to summary judgement regarding liability and had
thus conclusively established that they were innocent landowners
for purposes of the "current landowner" prong of the government's complaint. 8 3 In what could be seen as a hollow victory
for the defendants, the court would not grant their summary
judgement motions pertaining to liability under the "past owner
or operator" prong of the government's complaint, in the absence of adequate information regarding this issue.' 8 4 Moreover,
in so holding the court correctly realized that the innocent landowner defense was inapplicable to this prong of liability because
under such a defense a landowner is required to have acquired
the property after the disposal or placement of the hazardous substances.' 8 5 Finally, the court, in referring to a motion to dismiss
the entire CERCLA count based on defenses outside of CERCLA
section 107(b), indicated that there seemed to be some question
whether CERCIA section 107(b) is an exclusive and exhaus178. Pacific Hide, 716 F. Supp. at 1345. PCBs are classified as a hazardous
substance under CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). In March, 1983, about six
months after the stock transfer took place, federal agents discovered the capacitors and discovered that many of them were leaking the PCBs into the pit. Pacific
Hide, 716 F. Supp. at 1345. EPA, in its cleanup, removed 590 capacitors, twenty
drums of waste, and substantial amounts of contaminated soil from the pit. Id.
179. Pacific Hide, 716 F. Supp. at 1345-46.
180. Id. at 1346.
181. Id.
182. The defendants were the grandchildren of the first of the three second-generation owners who had inherited the property from the original owner,
the child of the second of the three second-generation owners (who never took
part in the operation of the business), and the wife of the third of the three
second-generation owners who had transferred his interest in 1982. Id.
183. Pacific Hide, 716 F. Supp. at 1350.
184. Id. at 1349-50. The liability section of CERCLA names current owners
and operators (CERCLA § 107(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)) and past owners
and operators (CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)) as PRPs.
185. See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
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tive'8 6 list of defenses available in a CERCLA action. In its refusal to grant summary judgement to those defendants raising
these defenses, the court held that the issue had not been adequately briefed and that it would await a more detailed briefing
18 7
before deciding such a complicated issue.
In its opinion, the court reduced its analysis to the question
of whether the various defendants had conducted all appropriate
inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property so
as to meet the "know or had reason to know" test of CERCLA
section 101 (35)(A). a18 It was undisputed that although a contractual relationship existed between the present owner defendants
and the individuals owning the facility at the time of disposal,
these present owners could overcome this bar to a third party defense by meeting the all appropriate inquiry standard. 8 9 The
court thereby recognized that the critical issue to be decided was
whether or not this standard was met.' 90
Additionally, the court noted the hierarchy intended by Congress, contained in the legislative history of SARA, that commercial transactions were to be held to the highest all appropriate
inquiry standard, private transactions were to be given more lenience, and inheritances and bequests were to be treated most leniently. 19 ' The court then characterized the case before them as
186. Pacific Hide, 716 F. Supp. at 1350. But see United States v. Stringfellow,
661 F. Supp. 1053, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that these statutory defenses
are exclusive); see also CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (stating that liability under CERCLA is "subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of
this section ..
") (emphasis added).
187. Pacific Hide, 716 F. Supp. at 1350. The court felt that since this was a
pro se motion on the part of two of the defendants, they would deny the motion
without prejudice to the rights of the defendants to raise the issue again upon a
full briefing in a subsequent motion. Id.
188. Id. at 1347-48. The court realized, of course, that the defendants also
had to meet the requirements of CERCIA sections 107(b)(3)(a) and (b) in addition to establishing that they had undertaken all appropriate inquiry. Id. However, the court never really discussed whether the defendants had met these
requirements. One would have to assume that, since the defendants won their
summary judgement as current owners, the court felt they had.
189. See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
190. Pacific Hide, 716 F. Supp. at 1348.
191. Id. See supra notes 10, 85, 159, 172 and accompanying text. The puzzling point about such a Congressionally established hierarchy is that if a defendant acquired land through inheritance or bequest then, by the language of
the statute he would not have to establish that he made all appropriate inquiry
(i.e., that he neither knew, nor had reason to know, of the hazardous substances
which were the subject of the release or threatened release) into the previous
ownership and uses of the property-he would simply have to show that he inherited the land or it was bequeathed to him. CERCLA § 101(35)(A)(iii), 42
U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(iii). In other words, if legatee landowners are not subject
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192
more analogous to an inheritance than a private transaction,
thus attaching the most lenient measure of inquiry to their analysis of the defendants' actions. The court added that the immedi193
ate case was distinguishable from Wickland
for purposes of the "obviousness or likely presence of contamination on the property" determination dictated by CERCLA section
101(35)(B), since the PCBs that were the subject of the proceeding were not, in the opinion of the court, obvious or likely to the
respective defendants. 19 4 The court, however, gave insufficient
treatment to the "specialized knowledge or experience" determination dictated by CERCLA section 101(35)(B).1 9 5
The government, in response to the defendants' motion, forwarded the same argument made in Serafini, 19 6 namely that in no
way can "no inquiry" constitute "all appropriate inquiry." 197 The
government argued that "some inquiry" must be made to meet
the all appropriate inquiry standard.' 9 8 The court responded to
this argument by stating in pertinent part:

[A]t least one court has rejected this argument by the
Government.. .It would have been easy to draft into the
statute the very requirements sought by the Government: Congress could have simply said that some inquiry
must be made in every case. But Congress did not do so.
Instead, Congress used terms like "appropriate" and
"reasonable" in describing the necessary inquiry. The
choice of such terms indicates to this Court that Congress was not laying down the bright line rule asserted
by the Government. Rather, Congress recognized that
each case would be different and must be analyzed on its
to the all appropriate inquiry standard, then the level ofjudicial scrutiny should
be irrelevant. Following the language of the statute, the defendants in this case
should have won their summary judgement motion on this point alone.
192. Pacific Hide, 716 F. Supp. at 1348. The court stated that the defendants' interest in the land was not obtained in an arms-length private sales transaction: they obtained their initial interest by familial gift (shares of the
corporation) and their ultimate interest (ownership of the land) by a corporate
event beyond their control. fd.
193. 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20855 (N.D. Cal. 1988). See supra
notes 162-173 and accompanying text.
194. Pacific Hide, 716 F.Supp. at 1348.
195. Id.
196. 706 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Pa. 1988). See supra notes 145-159 and accompanying text.
197. PacificHide, 716 F. Supp. at 1348. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
198. Id.
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facts. 199

Therefore, the court held that all defendants had established, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that they were innocent landowners under the "current operator" prong of the government's
complaint.20 0 As previously mentioned, however, the court declined to rule on their liability under the "past owners or operators" prong of the government's complaint (i.e. that they owned
or operated the facility at the time that the hazardous substances
were released) because they were not provided enough evidence
20
on this issue. '
One may look at the result of this opinion in two ways. One
way is that Pacific Hide, like Serafini, casts more uncertainty than
certainty on the all appropriate inquiry standard of the innocent
landowner defense. One can also view this decision as demonstrating the court system's great reluctance to subject those who
are merely owners of land by inheritance to potentially tremendous liability for cleanup costs. 20 2 This would seem to be in keeping with Congressional intent. It is submitted that Pacific Hide
stands for the latter position and should thereby be held to its
facts or reasonably similar facts in order to afford much needed
protection from CERCILA liability for innocent landowners.
This overview of the relevant case law involving the innocent
landowner defense serves to demonstrate that the courts are
hardly consistent (or presenting a united front) on the subject of
liability in this area. A landowner, and his counsel, are unlikely to
find any useful guidance upon reading this set of cases. This area
is in need of clarification and standards for a current or prospective landowner to turn to when faced with questions of actual or
potential CERCLA liability. On June 6, 1989 many hoped that
this type of guidance would be forthcoming. Instead, they are
faced with largely the same unanswered questions, compounded
199. Id. at 1349 (citations omitted). The court then held that under the
facts of this case the conduct of the three grandchildren was reasonable under
all the circumstances. Id. Likewise, the court decided in favor of the wife of one
of the children of the original owner, holding that since the child had died her
acquisition of the property should be treated as an inheritance, also. Id. The
child of the owner who had never participated in the operation of the business
was also held to have acted reasonably under all the circumstances. Id.
200. Id.
201. Pacific Hide, 716 F. Supp. at 1349-50. The government's complaint
contained allegations that the defendants were liable under CERCLA section
107(a)(2) as owners and operators of the facility at the time the hazardous substances were disposed of. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 130.
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by the possibility of having to make a crucial decision regarding
their possible liability.
V.

THE EPA INNOCENT LANDOWNER GUIDANCE

Following years of development the EPA, on June 6, 1989,
issued its guidance concerning landowner liability, de minimis settlements, and settlements with prospective purchasers of contaminated property. 20 3 This policy sets forth the EPA's position on
issues of landowner liability20 4 and settlement with de minimis
landowners under CERCLA. 20 5 The policy analyzes the language
in CERCLA sections 107(b)(3) and 101(35) which provide landowners with the third party innocent landowner defense to CERCIA liability and the language in CERCLA section 122(g)(1)(B)
which provides the agency's authority for settlements with de
minimis landowners.2 0 6 The discouraging aspect of the policy is
that it leaves open the biggest hole that landowners, and seemingly the courts, were looking to have filled.
The one facet of the innocent landowner defense that courts
are struggling most with is that of the "all appropriate inquiry"
standard of CERCLA section 101(35)(A). 20 7 This is easily
demonstrated by the widely divergent approaches, erratic conclusions, and irreconcilable holdings in the Serafini, Wickland, and Pacific Hide decisions. The all appropriate inquiry standard is at the
heart of the innocent landowner defense.2 0 8 Any landowner who
attempts to claim the innocent landowner defense will have the
burden of proving that, prior to purchase, he conducted all appropriate inquiry into the condition and past uses of the property.2 0 9 This issue becomes the crucial determination to be made
when considering the defense.
The EPA, in issuing its policy on landowner liability, took a
hands-off attitude when addressing this issue. 210 They pointed to
the factors to be used in CERCLA section 101(35)(B), indicating
203. EPA Guidance, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235.

204. CERCLA §§ 107(a)(l), (2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(1), (b).
205. Id. § 122, 42 U.S.C. § 9622.
206. EPA Guidance, 54 Fed. Reg. at 34,236-243.

207. See supra notes 145-202 and accompanying text.
208. Absent all appropriate inquiry analysis, no standard exists with which
to evaluate the know or had reason to know requirement, hence CERCLA section 101(35) becomes vague and ambiguous.
209. CERCLA §§ 101(35)(A), (B), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A), (B).
210. EPA Guidance, 54 Fed. Reg. at 34,238.
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that such a determination is to be made on a case-by-case basis.2 1'
They stated, as an example, that a survey for contamination may
be appropriate in a commercial transaction (standard operating
procedure in today's corporate world), while it "may not" be appropriate for the purchaser of personal residential property. 21 2
They concluded that the determination will be made on the basis
of reasonableness under all of the circumstances. 21 3 This approach provides the courts with very little "guidance" that they
14
did not possess prior to the release of this policy.2
Additionally, the approach taken by the EPA leaves in the
dark those landowners who may require guidance as to what they
may do (or will have to do) prior to the acquisition of property to
fulfill the all appropriate inquiry standard in order to insulate
themselves from liability. While large industrial and commercial
landowners and purchasers now take extraordinary steps, often at
great expense, to ensure that they fulfill such a duty, smaller commercial and private real estate purchasers will be unable to ascertain what steps to take based upon the EPA's "guidance" in this
2 15
area.
One wonders if the EPA is running the risk of allowing separate industries to establish their own all appropriate inquiry standard by adopting industry-wide rules and standards to be
followed in certain commercial transactions. Arguably, they
would be able to point to the statutory language in CERCLA section 101 (35) (B) 2 16 that defines all appropriate inquiry in terms of
"good commercial or customary practice" as evidence that their
compliance with these rules and standards should fulfill their affirmative duty under CERCLA's "all appropriate inquiry" lan211. Id.

212. Id.
213. Id.
214. This exact language ("under all the circumstances") is used in the Pacific Hide decision. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text. In point of
fact, the EPA did not say anything here that wasn't already being used as a measuring stick. As such, the standard remains a vague one.
215. It is now standard procedure for commercial real estate buyers and
industrial concerns to secure the results of an environmental audit prior to an
acquisition. Moreover, most insurance carriers and commercial lenders insist
upon it. Insurer and lender liability are beyond the scope of this Article, but
suffice it to say that both types of institutions have been found liable in CERCLA
actions. Thus, it is not hard to understand their insistence on an environmental
audit. For a comprehensive overview of these issues, see generally Levitas &
Hughes, supra note 95; Glass, supra note 38.
216. See supra note 83.
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guage. 2 17 At least one commentator has noted such an
interpretation and that the Federal National Mortgage Association has attempted the first comprehensive effort to issue such
industry guidelines. 21 8 While no present conflict exists between
what an industry issuing guidelines considers all appropriate inquiry and what the EPA considers all appropriate inquiry this
does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that a conflict will
never arise. 2 19 If and when it does, in the absence of more compelling and well reasoned appellate court decisions than those at
the present time, 220 the EPA may have to litigate the issue with
very little objective evidence of what the standard ought to be.
They may be reduced to arguing what they think the standard
should be while a potentially liable defendant may be able to
point to the industry guidelines, coupled with the "good commercial or customary practice" statutory language, 22 ' and argue that
this is what the standard is. Without taking a position on whether
such an argument would or would not prevail, one can envisage
that the EPA may get painted into just such a corner someday.
An alternative may be for the EPA to get involved (or perhaps be consulted) in the drafting of industry-wide guidelines and
take an active role in periodically updating them. The EPA may
benefit by taking the initiative within certain industries in drafting
such guidelines in order to avoid any pitfalls later, ensuring that
their standards are being complied with. As an added benefit, such
initiative would finally give industrial and commercial concerns
some much needed guidance in this area. Moreover, the beneficial effect would probably extend beyond the particular industry
involved. While those within the industry would be given concrete guidelines to follow, those outside the particular industry
would be given a basis upon which to build in conducting what
they deem to be an all appropriate inquiry. This trickle-down effect would serve to further the EPA's interest as their opinion of
what constitutes an all appropriate inquiry would be adhered to in
some manner by all industrial and commercial concerns. While it
may be difficult to establish any set procedures or rules, it would
217. Id.
218. See Leifer, EPA's Innocent Landowner Policy. A PracticalApproach to Liability
Under Superfund, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 646 (Aug. 4, 1989).
219. It has already happened between the courts. See supra notes 154-159,

197-200 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 96-202 and accompanying text.
221. CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B). See supra notes 83
and 219 and accompanying text.
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certainly benefit all involved to at least establish minimums to be
adhered to that would serve as evidence that the party made a
good faith effort to meet the standard. From this base, it would
then be possible for such minimums to evolve into a more refined
and workable framework for future use.
Another obvious shortcoming in this regard is that individuals who engage in private residential transactions are given no
"guidance" at all on what would constitute "all appropriate inquiry" as it applies to them.2 2 2 The case law, as seen, also serves
as no basis for guidance in this area. The EPA policy does not
address, nor does it seem concerned with, this issue. Understandably, the EPA is more concerned with commercial and industrial
landowners than with individual private landowners. Yet the fact
that this issue does not arise as often as in the commercial and
corporate world does not justify ignoring it. It is in this area that
the EPA could have made material strides to provide the class of
private landowners with guidance in what will be considered all
appropriate inquiry for their type of transaction.2 2 3 Instead, the
EPA simply gives recognition to Congressional intent that the
level of inquiry involved in residential transactions for personal
use is expected to be less comprehensive than that involved in
commercial transactions.2 24 But they never define the level of inquiry. Thus, not only is the individual landowner given no "guidance" in this regard, he is not even supplied with a reference
point from which he may determine what will be expected from
him. The EPA has improperly disregarded this issue. Given the
often limited resources of many private landowners and the substantial expense of what is swiftly becoming considered standard
procedure in commercial transactions (e.g. environmental audits), it is submitted that it is imperative that the EPA at least establish the minimum inquiry that they will expect in private
residential transactions.
222. The all appropriate standard does not distinguish between individuals
and corporations. CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B). An individual property owner only knows that it was Congress' intent to hold them to a less
stringent standard than commercial and corporate entities. However, if an individual does not know where the high-water mark is, he will never know how
close to the surface he will be, nor how close he should be.
223. This could have been done without crossing the line, since Congress
intended to hold commercial and industrial concerns to a higher standard than
individuals. Establishing guidelines for individuals therefore will not give these
individuals reason to sleep easier at night. It may, in fact, cause them to be more
diligent if they determine that what the EPA expects from individuals is very
near what they are currently doing in this regard.
224. EPA Guidance, 54 Fed. Reg. at 34,238.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991

35

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 6

178

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.

II: p. 143

There may be many who feel that the EPA's failure to address
such an issue is more or less inconsequential, because almost all
cleanups and their resulting litigation concern commercial or industrial property. While this may be true, virtually no one would
want to risk being in such a position, regardless of how slim the
chance, if they had some means of insuring that they could avoid
that position. While gamblers might like the long odds that
would be present in such a scenario (i.e., the small chance that
they would be held liable for CERCLA cleanup costs), the enormous potential liability2 25 would more than outweigh such odds.
The subject of environmental insurance is beyond the scope of
this Article, but one can be sure that insurance carriers would
have welcomed any opinions on this policy that the EPA was free
to express. As such, it is submitted that the EPA should consider
enacting such guidelines for individuals engaged in private residential transactions.
Finally, the EPA expressed its opinion in the policy regarding
de minimis settlements with landowners who satisfy the requirements of CERCLA sections 122(g)(l)(A) or (B).2 2 6 The policy
states that if the Agency determines that a landowner has a persuasive case in proving that they will be able to meet the third
party defense requirements of CERCLA section 107(b)(3), the
Agency will entertain an offer for a de minimis settlement under
CERCLA section 122(g)(1)(B). 2 27 The EPA avers that the goal of
this policy is to allow parties who meet the criteria set forth in
CERCLA sections 122(g)(1)(A) or (B) to resolve their potential
liability as quickly as possible, thus minimizing litigation costs and
allowing the government to focus its resources on negotiations or
228
litigation with the major parties.
The unusual twist set out in this policy is the EPA's position
that a landowner who can establish either a straightforward third
party or a third party innocent landowner defense "may" be eligible for a de minimis settlement. 2 29 The question that springs to
mind is why should these landowners negotiate a de minimis settlement when, according to the statute,2 3 0 they are not liable at all?
The policy even goes so far as to state that if a landowner is able
to persuade the EPA that they may ultimately prevail in establish225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See supra note 130.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9622(g)(1)(A) and (B).
EPA Guidance, 54 Fed. Reg. at 34,238-39.
Id. at 34,239.
Id. at 34,239-40.
CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
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ing their third party defense at trial, they may be considered for a
de minimis settlement in exchange for cash consideration, as well as
access and due care assurances. 23 1 Again, one wonders why a
landowner would settle by making a cash payment, albeit relatively small, to the government when he is not liable for any damages by virtue of his landowner defense.
Keeping in mind that a de minimis settlement may constitute
only access and due care assurances, the query remains why a corporate entity would want to settle with the government when they
possess a bona fide defense to liability under CERCLA. Corporate entities are very cognizant of the public's perception of them
and a majority of the public looks upon a settlement as being tantamount to an admission of guilt. One wonders why a corporation would run the risk of a negative image, particularly in an
increasingly environmentally conscious society. Private individuals may welcome such an opportunity to save litigation costs and
thus get themselves removed from any action brought by the government, but it would be unrealistic to think that corporate entities would so readily jump at any such opportunity when armed
with a legitimate statutory defense.
Conversely, in an area fraught with uncertainty, a corporate
PRP may view the de minimis provisions as providing an attractive
alternative to litigation for those who qualify. They might analyze
it as a question of risk preferences and perceptions of likely trial
outcomes. EPA and the corporate PRP may have different perceptions of the probability and the expected value of jury verdicts. Also, the relative certainty of negative press associated with
a settlement must be weighed against the possibly more damaging, though perhaps less likely, negative press associated with a
court judgment of liability. In addition, press generated by a dismissal would have to be considered in such an analysis. This area,
however, is one that presents acute concerns for corporate PRPs.
The American public is swiftly becoming more environmentally
conscious and concerned at this time than perhaps at any other
period in our history. Only recently has a large part of society
come to realize how delicate the balance is between man and his
ecological surroundings. Recent national events have expanded
this emerging societal awareness of environmental issues, and
man's capability to wreak havoc on his natural environment. Corporate entities are certain to become sensitive to these issues and
strive to improve their public image in this regard. Thus, settle231. EPA Guidance, 54 Fed. Reg. at 34,239-40.
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ments with EPA may lose their utility if it is believed that the public may perceive such settlements as an admission of liability or
fault. Public awareness, then, may compel corporate PRPs to litigate such liability. While such a scenario is far from certain, it can
not be said to be unlikely.
Thus, the policy seems muddled in this area. The use of the
word "may" in these statements raises especially troubling questions. Does this mean that one who possesses a bona fide statutory defense may not be eligible for a de minimis settlement? This
question appears to go unanswered and seems to be prevalent
throughout the discussion on de minimis settlements. Will the EPA
force such parties to trial and cause them to incur legal costs in
establishing this bona fide defense (when the EPA believes that
they will prevail at trial or that there is a substantial likelihood
that they will prevail) when the goal behind this policy is declared
to be just the opposite? 23 2 One could argue that an informal review by EPA for the purposes of allowing a de minimis settlement
may not accurately reflect a likely litigation outcome, but may be
less stringent thus encouraging settlements and freeing up
agency resources. This argument, however, leaves unresolved
the predicament that a bona fid innocent landowner may face in
such a situation. Compelling a statutorily liability-free landowner
to either litigate the issue of liability or settle with EPA appears
patently unjust, as well as rendering the third party defenses provided by Congress dead letters. The EPA's attempted reassurance that minimum settlements may only involve access and due
care assurances seems illusory, in that it would be difficult to imagine one on whose property hazardous substances were discovered denying access to the government or being careless in their
subsequent handling of the aforementioned substances. After all,
once an individual is aware that these substances are present on
his property it is in his best interest to deal cautiously with them.
These two conditions would necessarily be required. Moreover,
EPA states that "at a minimum" 23 3 access and due care assurances may constitute a minimum settlement, thus seemingly indicating that more may be required of PRPs for settlement.
It is submitted that the EPA's "guidance" policy issued on
June 6, 1989 represents a somewhat inadequate guide for landowners facing potential liability under CERCLA. While the EPA's
announced policies regarding de minimis settlements are a wel232. Id. at 34,239.
233. Id.
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come development for a certain class of landowners, their policies
addressing the topic of the innocent landowner defense leave
much to be desired. It is imperative that the EPA draft a more
useful and operational set of guidelines in order to resolve these
ambiguities.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The SARA amendments of 1986 have caused parties on both
sides of the fence in the environmental struggle to pause in confused reflection. While Congress set out to clear away some ambiguities and misconceptions inherent in a quickly passed statute
like CERCLA, they were more effective in some areas than they
were in others. It is clear that Congress perceived some injustice
in holding an innocent landowner liable for cleanup costs, yet in
trying to correct this injustice they seemed to outdo themselves
by making the defense tremendously vague and difficult to understand. A more efficient answer to this problem should be found.
The defense, confusing and ambiguous as enacted, has posed interpretive problems at both the administrative and judicial levels.
It is time for the courts or the EPA, or both, to step forward
and develop substantive guidelines and established minimums.
Allowing the inconsistencies to continue, as they have, will only
leave landowners with legitimate defenses as enacted, though
muddled and speculative as applied. The EPA should assert itself
in this area and adopt guidelines for landowners to follow in this
regard. Allowing the courts to do so is a slow, cumbersome process and, judging from past opinions, unlikely to produce much
certainty in this area. The court system seems too fragmented to
lend any meaningful dialogue to this discussion at this point in
time. Let the EPA set the patterns and the courts refine them,
when and if needed. The amount of environmental litigation is
increasing daily and will afford the courts more than ample opportunity to develop substantive and procedural refinements in
this arena.
While the EPA may feel that it is functionally impossible to
draft guidelines such as those suggested here, without them the
situation will probably get worse before it gets better. In the
years since the enactment of SARA there have been cases that are
almost polar opposites of each other. Even the EPA is disgruntled with some of these decisions.2 34 Now is the ideal time to act.
234. See, e.g., EPA Guidance, 54 Fed. Reg. at 34,238 n. 11, wherein the EPA
expresses their disagreement with the Serafini decision. This is in addition to
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The case law remains undeveloped enough so that it will not pose
a significant barrier to EPA action when adopting administrative
rules and regulations in this area. It will be a difficult task, but
without satisfactory guidelines the EPA seems to be simply treading water while waiting for the courts to definitively speak on the
subject. The EPA has the background and expertise to make
something like this work, not the courts (at least until the courts
receive more exposure to this area through litigation and are able
to develop the requisite expertise). Congress has erected the
framework, it is time for the EPA to add substance to it. Obviously, without such steps, the framework will be inadequate for its
intended purpose. While the EPA will undoubtedly take some
lumps along the way, what worthwhile project is free from setbacks and scrapes? The EPA needs to start formulating such a
policy as soon as possible, in order to be able to improve and
refine it through time, wisdom and experience.
Absent guidance, landowners, especially the private purchasers will have to play a guessing game. Inevitably, this will usually
result in too much or too little caution. While many would profess a preference to err on the side of caution, there is no guarantee this would result. Give them a map so that they may find their
way. Let those that stray do so at their own risk.
Paul C. Quinn
their assumed disagreement with the Pacific Hide decision, based on their arguments advanced at trial.
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